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Hearing of General Philippe Morillon in the French National Assembly[2]

(Thursday, January 25, 2001)
Presided over by Mr. François Loncle, President

President François Loncle: To provide some context, as we have just heard from General Janvier, who commanded the United Nations peacekeeping forces in former Yugoslavia in 1995, during the events in Srebrenica, I would like to remind everyone that General Morillon, whom I warmly thank, is now one of our colleagues as a Member of the European Parliament. He commanded UNPROFOR from October 1992 to July 1993 and the Rapid Reaction Force from 1994 to 1996.

General, thank you for agreeing to take part in this hearing. You are well aware of the circumstances that have led us to hold this session behind closed doors, although we initially planned to open it to the press. As you know, we received a statement from the Ministry of Defense on this matter. Nonetheless, we are very pleased to hear from you, General, and we will ask you questions afterwards.

General Philippe Morillon: I believe it is essential, even though you may already be informed, to recall the circumstances under which, before my appointment to command the Rapid Reaction Force, I personally became involved in the mission of the United Nations Protection Force, in what initially led to the Srebrenica tragedy.

Srebrenica is located along the route through which the Ottoman Empire entered the region. It is separated from the Sandžak province in Serbia, which is predominantly Muslim, by the Drina River. This area, including the surrounding countryside, had a majority Muslim population.

After the beginning of the crisis, marked by an initial offensive by the Serbs who seized Srebrenica,

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[2] The testimony of General Morillon in the National Assembly of France was taken from the website: https://www.voltairenet.org/?lang=fr
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the city was recaptured by Bosnian forces under the command of Naser Orić. Orić, who led the Bosnian army forces in the enclave, has himself admitted that he conducted military actions from Srebrenica which resulted in the massacres in the surrounding Serbian villages. These raids made him Enemy Number One among the Serbs, particularly after an attack they have never forgiven. This attack occurred during Orthodox Christmas Eve, a sacred night in January 1993, when his forces carried out raids on the Serbian villages and committed massacres of the civilians. In the spring of 1993, I was personally taken to visit the sites and witness the mass graves exhumed after the Serbs resumed their offensive in the region.

There was a degree of accumulated hatred that made me fear what, unfortunately, happened two years later: namely, if Srebrenica were to fall under Serbian control, there would be horrifying massacres. It was for this very reason that I took the initiative - after informing the relevant authorities within the United Nations, first General Wahlgren and then Kofi Annan himself, who was the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at the time - to go to the field and undertake the action that you are aware of, with the consequences you know.

Contrary to what has been said about me exceeding my mandate, this action was authorized by the mission entrusted to me, which was to assist any person in danger. I was convinced that the tens of thousands of inhabitants who had taken refuge in the city were in mortal danger – either from starvation and freezing or massacres triggered by the heightened desire for revenge among the Serbs. My actions were also driven by the mediation role I had been assigned by the International Conference on Peace in Yugoslavia and the mission of Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, followed by Martti Ahtisaari and Stoltenberg, who were negotiating the implementation of the Vance-Owen agreements in Geneva. You will recall that these agreements were eventually signed in Athens by Milošević himself, by Izetbegović - albeit reluctantly - and by Karadžic, and they included provisions similar to those incorporated into the Dayton Accords two years later.

I was convinced that the local population was in grave danger. My interlocutors assured me that they were only defending themselves, that they were not attacking anyone, and that they wanted nothing more than peace. I convinced them that, if that were truly the case, the only solution to prevent the excesses they attributed to their subordinates - whose actions they refused to take responsibility for - was to deploy observers on the ground.

Following the success of this action, I proposed at the time, with the agreement of Sarajevo, President Izetbegović himself, and the Serbs, the implementation of what I always described as a temporary expedient: the application in the Srebrenica area of the provisions we had negotiated with the Bosnians and the Serbs under the framework of the Vance-Owen plan. This involved demilitarizing the area rather than creating protected zones. An agreement was signed to this effect: the Bosnian fighters present in the enclave under the command of Naser Orić were to withdraw, those who chose to stay had to surrender their weapons, and the others were to join Bosnian forces stationed in Tuzla or Žepa. After their withdrawal, it was also agreed that the Serbs would gradually withdraw from all surrounding villages, as it was understood that the population of Srebrenica could not continue to live trapped in the enclave and would need to return

to the neighboring villages to have any chance of a decent life. That was the plan that had been accepted, but unfortunately, it could not be implemented because Mladić opposed its execution. The United Nations Security Council then decided to create the so-called protected zones extended to all the enclaves—six of them: Bihać, Sarajevo, Goražde, Žepa, Srebrenica, and Tuzla.

However, the decision taken by the Security Council was not followed by the deployment of the resources necessary for the mission assigned to my successors. That was when the tragedy unfolded. Kofi Annan's very courageous report acknowledged the UN's responsibilities. There was naïve idealism in New York, which I had denounced, that assumed the mere presence of peacekeeping forces - equipped with the bare minimum - would be sufficient to carry out the mission. This was an illusion that I had denounced, as did all my successors after me. This led to a situation where these protected zones - within which we were unable to prevent the actions of the Bosnian forces themselves - gradually became the areas where Bosnian forces felt relatively safe and from which they launched attacks against the Serbs. This explains the rage of the Serbs, and Mladić in particular, against this decision.

What followed, as you know, was the gradual erosion of our ability to act, the tragedy of hostages being taken in Sarajevo and elsewhere during the Ascension of 1995. It was also the resurgence of hope that we should take pride in, with the retaking of the Vrbanja Bridge. Minister Léotard, of course,

The National Assembly in Paris, France, January 17, 2023.
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remembers this. It was also the decision, accepted at France's urgent request, to deploy the Rapid Reaction Force, without which military commanders had no means at their disposal.

I recall, and have published, details of an earlier intervention considered during the Vukovar tragedy in Croatia in the autumn of 1991. A study was conducted in Metz, within the staff of the First Army, where I served as Chief of Staff, with the representatives of nine nations of the Western European Union at the time. Thirty-five senior officers studied possible interventions in this crisis and proposed plans, all of which required the deployment of a Rapid Reaction Force. This plan was not implemented because the European Union lacked the political will. Instead, the United Nations intervened with its forty-year tradition of peacekeeping operations, which aimed to avoid dragging soldiers into conflicts by arming them as lightly as possible and prohibiting the use of force except in self-defense. This was, of course, a mistake. Such an approach was suitable for interposition forces but entirely inadequate for the missions assigned to the UN force from the outset.

It was France that requested the implementation of this Rapid Reaction Force. It was France that insisted on moving towards this notion of extended self-defense, which allowed commanders on the ground to deploy their forces not only when the lives of their own soldiers were in danger but whenever the mission required it.

Could we, under these conditions - and this is the true criticism of France's actions and General Janvier's leadership - have stopped Mladić in his advance on the enclave of Srebrenica, then Žepa, and Goražde?

I sincerely believe the answer is no. There was an illusion, nurtured during the Gulf War, that pressing a button could summon fire from the sky to stop all the villains. That may have been true in the desert war, but it was not applicable in a terrain as unsuitable for armored deployment as Bosnia and Herzegovina in general, and the Srebrenica region in particular. Therefore, at this point, without knowing exactly what General Janvier may have told you, I sincerely believe that, as was later demonstrated in Kosovo, airstrikes alone could not stop Mladić's forces. Such actions could only have been effective as part of a ground operation. And here is the most important point in my view: this ground operation was not carried out by the Bosnian forces. As you probably know - and if you don't, I have published this without ever being contradicted - the Bosnian forces withdrew before the fall of Srebrenica. Naser Orić had left the enclave a week before Srebrenica fell. It would have been enough for his forces to mine the road to prevent tanks from entering Srebrenica.

I did not hesitate to say and write that Mladić fell into a trap in Srebrenica. Remember, we were on the verge of a withdrawal - just speaking of withdrawal - of the UN peacekeepers, as all voices, particularly in Washington at the time, were advocating for the lifting of the arms embargo. We had made it very clear that if the arms embargo was lifted, UN peacekeepers could no longer remain on the ground.

Mladić was justified in believing that the fall of Srebrenica would lead to the lifting of the arms embargo. But he didn't care at all, because he knew perfectly well that what the Bosnian forces needed were heavy weapons. No one would have allowed such weapons to reach the ground - neither the

Croats nor the Serbs - and heavy equipment cannot be parachuted. So, Mladić wanted nothing more than that. He expected resistance, which he did not encounter. I don't think he anticipated the massacres, but here, he completely underestimated the accumulated hatred. I don't believe he ordered them, but I don't know for certain; it's my personal conviction.

As for me, when I won my battle against Milošević, it was by announcing this: "If you take Srebrenica, there will be massacres, and the international community will take a stand against you."

I will conclude this introduction by saying that I am convinced the population of Srebrenica fell victim to reasons of state - reasons of state situated in Sarajevo and New York, certainly not in Paris. If I had been able to evacuate everyone who requested it at the time I intervened in Srebrenica, we would undoubtedly have saved a number of lives. You know that I was only able to evacuate the wounded and 2,000 to 3,000 women and children. It was Izetbegović 's authorities that opposed the evacuation of all those who requested it - and there were many - to Tuzla. We could not do it because we would have been seen as aiding the policy of "ethnic cleansing" ourselves, as the UN forces. So, I am not assigning blame. I once again acknowledge the courage of Kofi Annan in the report he wrote, taking responsibility. The fundamental mistake came from the fact that no one listened to the warnings. I testify to this as the commander of the Rapid Reaction Force at the time, as I was the one who gave General Soubirou his mission when he was sent to Ploče first and, unfortunately too late, to Sarajevo. France's intention was indeed to break free from the helplessness we were in, but unfortunately, this Rapid Reaction Force was deployed too late. It took the tragedy of Srebrenica, the sight of this population being treated like cattle - even before the extent of the massacres became known - for awareness to dawn that the UN forces needed to be given the means, including air support, and the right to use it.

I went to Washington in August 1995, immediately after the fall of Srebrenica. I arrived on August 4. The day before, the U.S. Congress had decreed the lifting of the arms embargo. Let me share a testimony that I have already cited. Upon my arrival, I was met by an American journalist. I took a taxi driven by a Black taxi driver who, upon hearing me speak, asked which country I was from. I told him I was French. He said to me: "You French, you're the only ones who understood. We can't let these people be treated like cattle."

I sincerely believe that we have no reason to be ashamed of the actions taken by France over there, that the stand at the Vrbanja Bridge was truly the first turning point. But in the United States, the shift only came after the fall of Srebrenica. I had written from the start that as long as Washington was not invested in resolving the crisis, there would be no solution. Clinton had the political foresight to sense, in response to the deep and intimate reaction of the American people, that he could confront the Congress. The decision to deploy the Rapid Reaction Force, the decision to activate the batteries deployed on Mount Igman—all of this ultimately led to Mladić's defeat and the signing of the Dayton Accords. But it took four years for this necessity to be recognized. I sincerely believe it was not for lack of effort by the French command on the ground or of the government, as far as I could tell, in advocating for it.

Mr. Pierre Brana: You mentioned something that struck me as absolutely essential—that you perceived very early on the hatred dividing the protagonists and relayed this feeling of hatred to the UN.

General Philippe Morillon: I also relayed it to Belgrade. I went to see Milošević and told him: "Here is what will happen." He helped me. If I succeeded in this struggle at the time, it was thanks to Milošević's stance. But New York was fully aware.

Mr. Pierre Brana: Ultimately, given that New York was aware of this hatred, the tragedy of Srebrenica - while not predictable, as no one can claim such a tragedy is predictable - became possible. That is to say, it was known that there was hatred capable of leading to massacres. So, the atmosphere must have been such that it was understood that the slightest misstep could result in something horrific.

You criticized the Bosnian army earlier.

General Philippe Morillon: No, not the Bosnian army. I said that Naser Orić, in my view, obeyed the order from Sarajevo to leave the area.

Mr. Pierre Brana: So, let's say the Bosnian government.

General Philippe Morillon: I am not afraid to say that it was Sarajevo that deliberately provoked the tragedy. It was the presidency - it was Izetbegović. Naser Orić obeyed the Bosnian presidency in Sarajevo.

Mr. Pierre Brana: The advantage with you is that you are both a politician and a military man. You can, therefore, synthesize the two perspectives.

General Philippe Morillon: That was an advantage I had, which my friend Janvier did not have. I'm not afraid to say it - I was in a situation where I had been given a political mission. Indeed, I had to assume both roles.

Mr. Pierre Brana: Do you believe that, in military terms - and here I am addressing the soldier - the Bosnian army could have held Srebrenica?

General Philippe Morillon: Yes. It would have cost significant casualties. I believe - I would need confirmation - that Mladić was prepared to accept the prospect of losing 7,000 men in that battle. He entered without a fight. When I tell you he fell into a trap, and that this trap was deliberate, it is not the criticism of Izetbegović. In my view, he had no other way to achieve his goal, which was to get the international community to take a stance on his side.

Mr. Pierre Brana: And in military terms, on the Dutch side?

General Philippe Morillon: The Dutch - I feel for them with all my heart, even today, for finding themselves in that appalling situation. They were, first of all, few in number. They saw the fighters themselves abandon the position, and they were not allowed to fire unless their lives were in danger. I don't want to cast blame on them. They might have made a last stand, perhaps. They didn't, and that's a fact, but I don't want to cast blame on them.

Mr. Pierre Brana: And what about General Janvier's directive stating that fulfilling the mandate was subordinate to the safety of UN personnel?

General Philippe Morillon: He surely explained this to you. It's the terrible consequence of the "zero casualties" policy, which I have always denounced. If you're not prepared to accept losses, then there's no point in having an army. I denounced this in Washington at the time as well.

Mr. Pierre Brana: When we met Admiral Lanxade, he told us that Srebrenica could have been saved in 1994, but not in 1995.

General Philippe Morillon: I think he's right. Srebrenica could have been saved by deploying the Rapid Reaction Force sooner. If the Rapid Reaction Force had been present in Srebrenica, it would have demonstrated a political will that Mladić was aware did not exist. Under those circumstances, I repeat, Mladić had only one objective: to provoke the withdrawal of the UN force so that he could face his enemies one-on-one, convinced as he was that he would defeat them effortlessly. To him, we were just "spoilers" getting in his way, and that was his only objective. Don't forget that he was the sole authority at the time, from 1993 onwards, and even more so later. I wrote and published that, when I met him after he opposed the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan, I told him: "You have taken your responsibility; you carry a heavy burden. I hope your people will never have to regret your decision."

Mr. Pierre Brana: How do you explain this abominable massacre?

General Philippe Morillon: By accumulated hatred. There were beheadings. There had been atrocious massacres committed by Naser Orić's forces in all the surrounding villages. When I went to Bratunac at the time of my intervention, I could feel it. Since then, there have been very good books about this tragedy that confirm what I am telling you.

Mr. François Léotard, Rapporteur: If the Chairman permits, I would like to refer to a personal experience from before my government mandate, which I can therefore share with the Information Mission very simply. I visited Yugoslavia in 1991-1992. In some places, people were nailed to barn doors. Women were raped in public squares. Reports from consuls or French observers at the Quai d'Orsay were extraordinarily soothing, saying that it wasn't serious and nothing would happen. I met most of the French diplomats in the region at that time, and they said things would settle down. That was the beginning of the crisis.

I remind you that Vukovar fell in 1991, and it was the first European city wiped off the map since 1945.

As for the hatred mentioned by General Morillon, it dates back to 1389. There are six centuries of hatred in this region. One can read The Knife by Vuk Drasković or The Bridge on the Drina by Ivo Andrić; the literature itself, Serbian or Bosnian, is the literature of hatred. People impaled, dismembered, and destroying one another for six centuries.

Mr. Pierre Brana: Who could imagine massacres as gratuitous as these in the 20th century?

Mr. François Léotard, Rapporteur: Those of the last war were dreadful. There were baskets of eyes, ears, and noses cut off. Unfortunately, this is a region where ethnic and religious hatred is deeply rooted and passed down from generation to generation. Our French stories about our German neighbors are nothing compared to what was passed down within Yugoslav families.

I'll stop there and return to asking General Morillon a few questions.

> I am not afraid to say that it was Sarajevo that deliberately provoked the tragedy. It was the presidency - it was Izetbegović. Naser Orić obeyed the Bosnian presidency in Sarajevo.

Mr. François Léotard, Rapporteur: I don't want to put you in a position of contradicting General Janvier, but I would simply like to ask you some questions that we asked him earlier. It is possible that your analyses are slightly different.

He spoke, as everyone knows, about significant divergences in the analyses and behaviors of the allies in this matter, particularly on the ground, with deputies or subordinates of other nationalities. Can you confirm this situation and its reality?

The second question ties in with the one Pierre Brana asked. At what point did you have a sense of a possible disaster in Srebrenica, and how did you convey this to the UN headquarters?

For the third question, which I myself asked General Janvier earlier, your analysis might be different, as I think I just understood. If, instead of 400 Dutch soldiers, there had been 400 French soldiers, regardless of their unit, do you think it would have unfolded in the same way?

General Philippe Morillon: Regarding the divergences between soldiers of different nationalities, I had a freedom of action that Janvier could never have had. Therefore, when I had problems with contingents, and I did, I often went directly to the governments concerned - for example, the Egyptian contingent contesting my decision to deploy them to certain locations. Of course, we had to consider the reactions of the leaders of each contingent. I was fortunate, at the time of the launch of the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in September 1992, and when I was entrusted with the command, to bring together the representatives of the staff and governments of the main contingents in Zagreb. I proposed a plan that was accepted by these governments and staff, which allowed me to tell the leaders of different contingents on the ground: "Either you accept this order, or I request your replacement." I don't believe Janvier ever found himself in such a position after me. No one after me was in this position because I was the only one with such initiatives. It's probably why, at the end of my mission, the UN appointed a permanent civilian delegate, Mr. Stoltenberg, who was in Geneva, not Sarajevo. I don't know what General Janvier may have told you.

Mr. François Léotard, Rapporteur: He emphasized the British.

General Philippe Morillon: I always had excellent relations with the British and never had any issues with them.

Mr. François Léotard, Rapporteur: At what point did you sense there would be a humanitarian disaster?

General Philippe Morillon: In the week preceding my action, I received a visit from Mr. Joxe, who was making his farewells. I took the initiative to go to the field with a few men because I knew that I could reach there alone, due to the respect each of the combatants had for me. So, I was the only one who could go there. I told Minister Joxe at the time and, of course, I told General Wahlgren, my superior. There were also a German photographer and a representative of *Doctors Without Borders* who had managed to enter Srebrenica. I myself had been to Srpska in the week preceding this. I received information from this doctor that people were genuinely dying of hunger and cold.

Mr. François Léotard, Rapporteur: Did you put this in writing?

General Philippe Morillon: Yes, surely. I have my notes.

Mr. François Léotard, Rapporteur: Could we have access to them?

General Philippe Morillon: I will ask for them to be found. I told Wahlgren, but he had just arrived. I must have written it down, as I sent daily reports to the UN.

President François Loncle: You mentioned Minister Joxe. For me, that recalls either late 1992 or early 1993. He was appointed to the *Cour des Comptes* at that time. I was in the government, and it was Pierre Bérégovoy who served as interim.

General Philippe Morillon: He left in February 1993. At the exact moment I was in Srebrenica, it was Mr. Bérégovoy. But I saw Minister Joxe during his farewell visit and expressed my concerns to him. That was most likely in February 1993.

General Philippe Morillon: Regarding what would have happened if the contingent present in Srebrenica had been French, I do not wish to delve into that subject.

Mr. François Léotard, Rapporteur: There has been talk of the Dutch failures. I would like to know your opinion as a military man. Personally, I do not share that sentiment. General Janvier said earlier that if it had been the French, it would have played out differently.

President François Loncle: Meaning they would have attacked, while the Dutch did not.

General Philippe Morillon: Throughout my time on the ground, I told my contingent commanders: "Only passivity is disgraceful. I don't want to hear about the rules of engagement. You can 'bug me' as much as you like with the mandate." Everyone knows that I held this attitude consistently. This was possible for me because I assumed both political and military responsibilities, but Janvier did not have this opportunity. Would the French have done a Camerone? It's in their tradition. If there had been legionnaires, yes. That said, let's get to the heart of the matter - and now it's the Christian in me speaking. The heroic last stand is forbidden by Christian morality because war is considered an evil, and the implementation of military action, being a lesser evil, can only be justified if there is a chance of achieving the objective. It is not prohibited by military regulations; in fact, it is even celebrated. I was a legionnaire myself. Some have said that I staged a heroic last stand in Srebrenica. No. I was aware that I had a chance of winning that battle, but I would not have led the few men I had with me - including, remember, some Americans - if it had only been about saving the honor of the United Nations. Srebrenica in 1995? Saving honor, yes, that is in the French tradition. But I refuse to condemn the Dutch.

Ms. Marie-Hélène Aubert: I feel somewhat conflicted. On the one hand, our French interlocutors say - and I'm slightly exaggerating - "We were the only ones who wanted to do something."

General Philippe Morillon: I think that's true.

Ms. Marie-Hélène Aubert: On the other hand, the French were always considered rather pro-Serb. I don't say this in an accusatory manner.

General Philippe Morillon: I don't take it that way.

Ms. Marie-Hélène Aubert: Which is understandable, actually - there are cultural and religious affinities that led the French to be more lenient toward the Serbs than toward the Muslims. I use the term "Muslim" intentionally.

General Philippe Morillon: It was a nationality at the time.

Ms. Marie-Hélène Aubert: That makes sense. So, I see a certain contradiction here. I have a hard time believing that it's solely an Anglo-American conspiracy accusing the French of having been

too lenient towards the Serbs in the beginning. There are also objective reasons for this. Moreover, François Léotard just mentioned that reports from the field seemed to downplay the scale of events, attributing them to ancestral conflicts. What is your perspective on this contradiction?

Secondly, regarding Sarajevo, it is clear - and all our interlocutors have told us this - that Sarajevo was the primary concern for the French. In the Vance-Owen plan or the Juppé-Kinkel plan, what happened to the eastern enclaves? Was there not a sort of tacit agreement to let things slide in order to save Sarajevo, even at the cost of allowing the enclaves to be neglected, without fully imagining the scale of the massacres, particularly in Srebrenica?

President François Loncle: On the first point, we can also refer to an issue often raised by commentators and historians: the weight of history and Serbia's engagement alongside the Allies during the Second World War, as well as the tradition of Franco-Serbian friendship. Did this play a role in any way?

General Philippe Morillon: If we gave that impression, it's because, as a rule, when we had obtained an agreement from the Serbs - there was only one level at which an agreement could be reached: it was Mladić - he kept his word, whereas the others did not.

President François Loncle: The others…?

General Philippe Morillon: The Bosniaks, and even the Croats, to a lesser extent. But that had no impact on the ground, at least when I was there.

Of course, the Serbs always highlighted Franco-Serbian friendship. But for us on the ground, tasked with impartiality, if we were perceived as siding with the Serbs, it was because we adhered strictly to impartiality and denounced - something I was the first to do during my entire time there - attacks when they came from other parties. The international press, and public opinion through it, sided with the weaker party, i.e., the Bosniaks, against the Serbs. It was a difficult role to play, but if I managed to achieve what I did in Srebrenica at that time, it was because I believe - and I still receive testimonies about this today - that all three communities recognized this impartiality. While I was on the ground, there was no question of any of my subordinates taking sides. But when you remain neutral, you're not always understood, and that may be the root of this criticism. I don't know if my answer satisfies you.

Ms. Marie-Hélène Aubert: You personally, beyond the impartiality expected of you, did you in fact…?

General Philippe Morillon: The day Mladić broke his word, it made headlines in the media. I refused to shake his hand.

Ms. Marie-Hélène Aubert: For you, was it clear that there was an aggressor and a victim or not?

General Philippe Morillon: When I left Sarajevo on July 13, 1993, I received particular attention from all parties, starting with Izetbegović, but not from Mladić.

Ms. Marie-Hélène Aubert: Did you consider that there was an aggressor and a victim, and that the victim should be defended, or not?

General Philippe Morillon: No. I experienced the crisis from its beginning in April 1992 and I always refused to label parties as aggressors or victims. This is something the Bosniaks held against me for a long time.

President François Loncle: How would you define the conflict?

General Philippe Morillon: This appalling tragedy, which was unforeseen, is the resurgence of the fear

of domination. The Serbs in the mountains around Sarajevo were there because they had been told that if they didn't go, their wives would have to wear Islamic veils. I can attest to that. This is the sickness of this country. Minister Léotard has already mentioned that it has lasted for seven centuries. As long as there is an authority above them ensuring that no one dominates, the system holds. This has historically been the role of the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Tito. If Tito succeeded in his reconciliation pact, it was based on this theme. And this is the role they expect from Europe today. This is why we must stay there. I continue to maintain personal relationships with all the countries involved as part of the European Union delegation for Southeastern Europe.

The answer lies here: it is the disease of fear that has been exploited, and we cannot forgive those who have taken advantage of it by recalling past massacres. This solidarity in the act of killing immediately drags into it those men and women who, just before the tragedy, were marching in the streets of Sarajevo saying, "He is Serbian, I am Muslim, we could never fight one another." But when their brothers fall, the vicious cycle of violence and fear - blood and vengeance - is unleashed. I tried to break it during my time there, but unfortunately without success. Quite honestly, that is how I experienced it.

President François Loncle: Thank you very much, General. That was extremely insightful.

General Philippe Morillon: I told journalists, because, of course, they tried to draw me into this debate: I refuse to be seen as the "white eagle" while Janvier could be cast as the "black eagle".

Internet source

https://www.voltairenet.org/article9988.html

Photo No. 4: The monument to Kings Petar I Karađorđević and Aleksandar I Karađorđević in Aleksandar I of Yugoslavia Square in Paris.

Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia